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THE MINIMUM COMMISSION SYSTEM AND THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
I. MINMx COMMISSION SYSTEM
As part of its exhaustive study of the securities market in 1963,' the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2 examined the minimum commission-
rate schedule which applies to every transaction executed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). The study concluded that market practices varied
materially from the commission regulations established by the Board of
Governors of the NYSE. The SEC findings and later developments in the
securities market effected a major revision in the rate structure.4
The minimum rate structure in existence at the time of the SEC study
established, among other things, rates for members of the exchange which
differed from those applicable to non-member brokers.5 Commission rates
paid by the general public were identical to the rates paid by non-member
brokers when dealing with member brokers.0 The rate structure made no
allowance for volume discounts. Consequently, a broker's commission was
determined by the value of round lots, i.e., any multiple of the unit of trading
(which is usually 100 shares), of the order received, and the customer was
not given a discount in proportion to the size of his order.7
As a result of the inflexible rate structure, many members of the securities
community have suffered economically. For example, institutional investors
who buy and sell large blocks of stock were subject to high commission rates
since discounts were not allowed for volume trading. "[T]he commission
which a member firm is required by Exchange rules to charge its customer
on a 10,000 share transaction is 100 times the commission it is required to
charge on a 100 share transaction and the commission on 100,000 shares is
1000 times the commission on 100 shares."'8 It was suggested that the in-
creased effort expended on the execution of a large transaction, compared
with the effort made on a small transaction, did not correspond to the in-
creased commissions charged on large block transactions.0 The rate structure
1. SEC, Special Study of Securities Markets (1963).
2. The SEC has the power to regulate commissions pursuant to § 19b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (9) (1964).
3. A commission is that fee which must be paid to an agent for exccuting an order to
purchase or sell securities. The uniform commission structure has been a part of the NYSE
since the exchange's establishment in 1792. G. Leffler & L. Farwell, The Stock Market 382
(3d ed. rev. 1963). It is suggested that the fixed commission was an incentive to brokers to
join the NYSE and to insure the auction-like quality of the market.
4. See note 35 infra.
5. Special Market Study Release No. 30, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. ff 76,921, at 81,422 (SEC July 17, 1963).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,523, at 83,080 (SEC Jan. 26, 1968).
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likewise made no allowance for reduced commissions to be paid by non-
member brokers, although such allowances were made for member brokers
dealing with other member brokers.
II. BUSINESS PRACTICES
To avoid the harsh results of the minimum commission rates, members
of the financial community devised certain practices to achieve the flexibility
necessary in business transactions. Since member brokers compete for the
business of non-member brokers, and since non-member brokers must pay
the fixed commission, member brokers would, in a later transaction, allow
non-members to recoup a portion of the high commission paid the member
for executing the prior order. For example, a member broker would trade
with the non-member broker on a regional exchange or over-the-counter to
compensate the non-member for the large commission paid to the member
during the prior transaction executed on the NYSE. The regional exchanges
and over-the-counter markets are not governed by the NYSE rules, and thus
the brokers could provide for rebates by way of this reciprocal business ar-
rangement. 10 The SEC also discovered that many member brokers furnished
non-member brokers or large block investors with certain services, such as
research assistance, wire services and promotional material', to return, in
effect, part of the paid commission. Unlike the NYSE, many regional ex-
changes allowed commission rebates to their brokers as an incentive for trading
on the smaller regional exchanges. 12
Non-member brokers on regional exchanges often act as "clearing agents"
in order to reclaim a portion of a large commission paid to a member broker
for an earlier transaction executed on the NYSE. The member broker will
use the regional exchange to secure the order of another customer and declare
the regional broker a "clearing agent". Regional exchange rules allow "clearing
agents" to retain as much as 50% of the commissionY3
Another of the more significant developments which have undermined the
commission rate structure is the practice of permitting give-ups. Give-ups are
very similar to the business practices previously discussed. The major dif-
ference is that give-ups are actually ordered by the customer rather than
arranged by the brokers. A give-up occurs when a large investor directs the
brokerage firm, which it has used to execute a transaction on the exchange,
to give part of its commission to another firm. This is done to reward the
second firm for some service it has rendered the investor and can obviously
be agreed to only if the commission received by the executing firm, less the
give-up, is adequate to compensate that firm for its efforts. Therefore, it
9. Id.
10. Special Market Study Release No. 30, (1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. fJ 76,921, at 81,422 (SEC July 17, 1963).
i1. Id.
12. Id.
13. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, (1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,523, at 83,082 (SEC Jan. 26, 1968).
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would appear, especially in cases where a substantial percentage of the com-
mission is given up, that the original minimum commission established by
the exchange and charged by the executing firm was more than adequate;
otherwise the member firm would be unwilling to give up part of that com-
mission.
The mechanics of executing give-ups are rather involved, largely due to
the NYSE's rule prohibiting give-ups to firms who are not members of the
exchange.14 Two of the more commonly used procedures are set forth below.
Under the first method, the NYSE member who must execute the sale on the
NYSE will then execute other unrelated sales on regional exchanges which
do permit give-ups. All or part of the commission§ on these sales will be given
up to non-New York Exchange members as directed by the original inves-
tor.15 A second plan for avoiding the prohibition against give-ups requires
the exchange firm to buy services from the non-member, who is to receive
the give-up, at a price considerably in excess of the actual value of the ser-
vice.16
Despite the exchanges' prohibitory rules,'17 give-ups by exchange members
continue to exist and they constitute an important aspect of the securities
industry. The average give-up is usually estimated to be 40%1/ of the original
commission' 8 and the total amount of give-ups per year was stated, in 1966,
to be about $25 million annually.' 9 This figure was undoubtedly much higher in
1968. "[W]hat the rate schedule fails to do, the industry accomplishes in-
formally .... -20
Important as the give-up is to the industry as a whole, it has a greater
effect on certain segments of the industry, especially the regional exchanges
and the small investment houses. Banning give-ups "would deal an almost
mortal blow to several of the smaller regional exchanges which have thrived
in recent years as a direct result of the give-up system. '21 The importance
of give-ups to the regional exchanges may be illustrated by the following
examples. Between 1960 and 1965 the Detroit Stock Exchange had a very
liberal give-up policy, and during this period its dollar volume quadrupled
as compared to a 93% increase in the New York Stock Exchange's volume.2 -2
14. NYSE Const. art. XV, § 1, in NYSE Guide 1701.
15. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1968, at 33, col. 7.
16. Id. at 38, col. 5-6.
17. It should be noted that the New York Stock Exchange and the Midwest Exchange
are the only exchanges that have any rules against give-ups. Bus. Week, Jan. 14, 1967, at 125.
18. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1968, at 3, col. 3. Cf. Wall St. J., July 10, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
Although no figures are available, it is generally believed that virtually all give-ups occur
on large transactions executed by institutional investors.
19. Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
20. Special Market Study Release No. 30, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 9 76,921, at 81,422 (SEC July 17, 1963).
21. Graham, Possible Effects of Proposed New Commission Structure, 107 Trusts and
Estates 841, 844 (1968).
22. Bus. Week, Jan. 14, 1967, at 125.
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Following a liberalization of the give-up policies of the other exchanges, the
Detroit Exchange's volume increased only 15% as compared to the New
York Exchange's increase for the same year of 387.2 The reverse occurred
when the Boston Stock Exchange amended its rules to allow give-ups. In the
first ten months of the following year the exchange's volume exceeded that
of the entire previous year by 577.24
The importance of give-ups to regional exchanges is matched by their ne-
cessity to many small brokerage firms. Government figures show that in 1966,
give-ups amounted to approximately 60% of the average net income of small
brokers and non-New York Stock Exchange brokers.25
The effect of eliminating the give-ups would obviously be extensive and
harmful to these two groups. Those who support the give-up contend that
there would be wider adverse results. They point out that the regional ex-
changes and the small firms might be forced out of business if the give-up
were outlawed 26 and contend that this is detrimental to the investment com-
munity since it would result in a decrease in competition. They also say that
ending the give-up, which is often used to reward firms for carrying on re-
search for the investor,27 would result in a decrease in the use of research by
these firms.2 8 A further danger of ending give-ups is that it might encourage
23. Id.
24. Id. at 126.
25. N.Y.Times, July 18, 1968, at 48, col. 5. See Mforgello, Why the 'Give-Up'-And Why
It's Doomed, Newsweek, July 22, 1968, at 67; Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1966, at 4, col. 3.
26. This is true as to the firms because investors who now reward them by give-ups
would find it difficult to reward them directly, by placing their orders directly with the
small firm. This is due to the fact that the small firms are not in the position to execute
the large transactions of these institutional investors. To execute such a transaction, the firm
must be able to buy large blocks of shares which it is at that time unable to sell. For
example, if the investor wishes to sell 75,000 shares of stock, the firm may only be able to
find buyers for 50,000; the firm must therefore buy 25,000 shares itself to complete the
transaction. Small firms are generally unable to afford the necessary outlay.
Throughout the discussion of give-ups the distinction between the mutual fund itself
investing and people investing in the mutual fund must be kept in mind. In the former,
efficiency would demand that the fund use one broker to execute the transaction; in the
latter, competition would require the fund to use as many brokers as possible since the
greater the number of brokers selling shares in the fund, the greater the possibility of sell-
ing fund shares.
27. The importance of this position has been undermined to a degree by testimony
before the SEC. Under questioning, John Hake, the Chairman of Anchor Corp., a mutual
fund, agreed that the major portion of give-ups are given as a reward for selling fund
shares, and that only about 16% are given for research. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1968, at
60, col. 4; Wall St. J., July 25, 1968, at 2, col. 3.
28. The reasons for this are numerous. First, it must be understood that while, in the
case of mutual funds, research costs are paid out of management fees, brokerage commissions
are paid by fund shareholders. If give-ups were abolished, the funds would either have
to forego research or spend management money for it. The latter isn't likely since it would
necessitate an increase in these fees which both the SEC and fund shareholders have already
objected to as excessive. Morgello, supra note 25. Secondly, a decrease in the use of re-
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funds and investment firms to turn over their portfolios more rapidly than
they would otherwise like to, in order to generate commissions to reward the
people now compensated by give-ups. 20 Finally, those who support the give-
up point out that its abolition might cause mutual funds and other large
investors to parcel out orders to many firms, thus decreasing the efficiency of
the entire process and threatening the order of the market.30
Despite these arguments the SEC pursued its course of attacking the give-up,
which the SEC contends is a rebate and is detrimental to the efficient operation
of the exchange.31 The SEC argues that give-ups benefit the funds rather
than their shareholders, and therefore may constitute fraud against these
shareholders.32 It holds that where a mutual fund manager can "recapture
for the benefit of the fund a portion of the commission paid by the fund, he
is under a fiduciary duty to do so . . . .,33 To implement this belief, the SEC
has proposed several rules concerning give-ups, 34 and the stock exchanges
have suggested proposals of their own.35
search, with the probability of a resulting deterioration of performance, might result from
the abolition of give-ups because it would cost more to pay for research outright. Wall St.
J., Aug. 1, 1968, at 2, col. 3.
29. Loomis, The SEC Has a Little List, Fortune, Jan. 1967, at 111, 114.
30. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1967, at 39, col. 1.
31. Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1966, at 2, col. 3.
32. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1968, at 73, col. 1.
33. Id. at 78, col. 5.
34. It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company or affiliated person of
such registered investment company to directly or indirectly, to order or request any broker
or dealer:
(a) to pay or arrange for the payment, directly or indirectly, of all or any portion of a
commission on any securities transaction to any broker, dealer or any other person unless
pursuant to a written contract the full amount of such remittance is required to be paid
over to such registered investment company, or fees owed by or charged to such registered
investment company are required to be reduced in an amount equal to the remittance;
(b) to designate or employ any broker or dealer on any transaction to transmit, execute
or clear a transaction or to perform any other function for which compensation is required
or made unless pursuant to a written contract the full amount of such compensation is
required to be paid over to such registered investment company or fees owed by or charged
to such registered investment company are required to be reduced in an amount equal to
such compensation. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, at 9 (SEC Jan. 26, 1968)
(Not reprinted in CCH).
Had this proposal been adopted, it would have been a temporary rule, effective until
the results of the 1968 SEC Hearings into the Minimum Commission System were disclosed.
The SEC proposal did not attempt a material variation in the commission rate schedule
nor did it attempt to strengthen the NYSE rule on fixed rates. Rather, it would have im-
posed a fiduciary duty on managers of investment companies to use give-ups for the benefit
of their principals, the individual investors. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,523, at 83,085-86 (SEC Jan. 26,
1968).
35. The NYSE interim rule which was put into effect on December 5, 1968, permits
volume discounts, determined by the size of a single order as well as the portfolio business
transacted by the individual investor during a particular period of time. The new rule also
prohibits certain types of business practices which were previously used to escape the ap-
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The abolition of the give-up, while certainly not welcomed by the invest-
ment community, has not been fought as hard as might have been expected,
largely because the very existence of the give-up and the business practices
previously discussed attest to the inequities of the minimum commission. Thus,
SEC and exchange proposals regarding give-ups 0 were often coupled with pro-
posals for volume discounts.3 7
It seems obvious that a minimum commission which, when applied to
large transactions, allowed an average of 40o,38 and up to 80%00 of the
commission to be given away, is excessive, at least as it applies to these large
transactions. However, arguments have been presented against a volume dis-
count. One expert contends that it would result in an increase in the com-
mission charged smaller customers.40 While this is a possibility, it seems
improbable in view of the existence and powers of the SEC.4 According to
the same expert, the only alternative to such an increase, in the event of a
volume discount, would be a deterioration in the services and personnel in
the industry, an inhibition of the flow of capital into the industry, the ex-
tinction of smaller firms, and a decrease in the ability of firms to meet reg-
plication of the rate schedule. Reciprocal business arrangements are permitted as long as
they are not customer directed. Customer directed give-ups are eliminated with a few ex-
ceptions. A customer who uses the offices of another firm for a short period of time may
direct the broker to whom he paid the full commission to give-up part of that commission
to the other firm since the customer used the firm's office facilities as a convenience. Also,
a NYSE Exchange Brief noted that the proposal did "not prevent broker-dealer affiliates
of institutions from crediting commissions to those institutions." The NYSE rule reduced
rates applicable to non-members on orders over 1,000 shares and decreased member commis-
sions by 7%. As a result of this new rule, the SEC may possibly require the regional ex-
changes to prohibit customer directed give-ups. Since many stocks are listed on the NYSE
and the regional exchanges, it would be inequitable for regional exchanges to continue their
policy of permitting give-ups on NYSE stocks while such give-ups would be prohibited if
the stocks had been sold on the NYSE. This interim rule will be effective until the NYSE,
regional exchanges, and the SEC have completed the extensive examination of the commis-
sion rate structure and a permanent rate schedule is established. Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8239, [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 77,523, at 83,034-&;
(SEC Jan. 26, 1968).
36. SEC and NYSE proposals, supra notes 34 and 35.
37. "Studies by the New York Stock Exchange show that the number of transactions
involving 10,000 shares or more has increased from 2171 in 1965 to 6685 in 1967, that the
number of shares involved in these transactions has more than tripled, and that their share
of reported volume has increased from 3.1 percent to 6.5 percent." Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8239, [Transfer Binder 1967-69] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 77,523, at 83,0S0
(SEC Jan. 26, 1968).
38. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
39. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1968, at 26, col. 2.
40. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1967, at 39, col. 1.
41. The SEC has the power to regulate brokerage commissions. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 19b, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1964). If these practices developed, it would seem
likely that the SEC would exercise these powers.
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ulatory requirements. 42 However, this argument appears rather tenuous when
one considers that such a high percentage of the commissions on large trans-
actions is now voluntarily given away. The SEC has been able to successfully
attack the arguments presented in favor of keeping the present commission
schedule and has convinced the NYSE that a volume discount would, in the
long run, be in its best interests.
The 1968 SEC Hearings into the Minimum Commission System have in-
evitably gone beyond give-ups and volume discounts and have brought into
question the entire subject of fixed rates. The setting of rates under the
minimum commission structure clearly constitutes price fixing.43 Unless the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 confers some immunity on the NYSE the
minimum commission would be illegal per se, even if reasonable.41 Although
the minimum commission has always been set by the exchanges, the Act
in effect grants the SEC power to order the exchanges to alter their rules
regarding reasonable commissions if it is "necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon
such exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange . . . .,4 It
does not expressly provide that exchanges shall be immune from antitrust
legislation.
III. ANTITRUST AND THE MINIMUM COMMISSION
The issue of antitrust immunity was presented to the courts in Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange,46 which was essentially a boycott case rather than one
concerned with minimum commission rates. In that case, the plaintiff sued
for damages as a result of the NYSE's instruction to member firms to discon-
tinue wire service with Silver, a non-member dealer in over-the-counter secu-
rities. The court of appeals held the NYSE immune from antitrust liability
because the exchange acted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 47
The court stated that, according to the scheme of the Act, the securities indus-
try was to be regulated by the SEC and the exchanges, "with the Commission
exercising general supervisory power over the exchanges' self-regulation. 4 8
Furthermore, since the Act provided for self-regulation of the exchanges,
under the control of the SEC, this self-regulation would be threatened if the
exchange were held liable under the antitrust laws. The court found that the
exchanges, if held liable, would "be reluctant to fulfill their obligations under
the Securities Exchange Act."149
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that "the Exchange has plainly exceeded
42. Supra note 40.
43. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
44. Id. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
46. 373 U.S. 341 (1963), rev'g 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'g on other grounds, 196
F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
47. 302 F.2d at 715.
48. Id. at 716.
49. Id. at 721.
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the scope of its authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-
regulation" 50 since it neither gave notice to the plaintiff nor allowed him a hear-
ing. On the issue of antitrust liability, the Court held that exchanges were not
expressly immune from antitrust laws and that an exemption is implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the
minimum extent necessary.51 Silver established that exchange activity, such as
fixing minimum fees, which otherwise would be a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act, is to be measured by the reasonableness standard.52 Exchanges are
exempt from antitrust liability if they act reasonably to carry out the objectives
of the Act. 53
Since the Silver decision, there has been one case applying the reasoning of
the Supreme Court to the problem of reconciling the minimum commission sys-
tem employed by the exchanges with the antitrust laws and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.' 4 In this case, plaintiffs attacked the commission system
as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.55 The district court, relying on Silver,
held that if the commission system were within the 1934 Act, it could not
be a per se violation. After examining the 1934 Act and the history of the mini-
mum commission system, Judge Hoffman found it clear that this system did
fall within the Act. The court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari with Chief Justice Warren dissenting.
Three arguments have been advanced for exempting exchanges from antitrust
laws. First, the exchanges would be burdened by lengthy antitrust suits and
their activities impaired while the suits were pending.50 Second, the regulation
of exchanges is a specialized field and courts should not take jurisdiction over
exchange regulations since the SEC has extensive knowledge of these prob-
lems. 57 Finally, the policy of exchange self-regulation, provided by the Secu-
rities Exchange Act, would be defeated., 8 On the other hand, it is suggested
that exchanges should be held liable under antitrust laws because Congress has
never expressly granted immunity 50 to them. It is argued that the Securities
Exchange Act expressly immunizes associations of over-the-counter dealers and
that if the exchanges were to be exempt from the application of antitrust laws,
such exemption would have been expressly stated.60 It is also suggested that
antitrust liability should be imposed because price fixing is contrary to the idea
50. 373 U.S. at 365.
51. Id. at 361.
52. Comment, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or Free Com-
petition?, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 213, 228 (1965).
53. Id.
54. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aft'd, 371 F2d 409 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967), rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 912 (1963).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
56. Comment, supra note 52, at 232.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id.
60. 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 923, 924 (1963).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of free enterprise and because the fixed commission structure, in light of the
practices examined previously, does not guarantee "minimum" fees paid to
member brokers.0 '
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The Department of Justice, which is responsible for enforcing antitrust laws,
supports, to a large extent, the position that antitrust liability should be im-
posed. The Department has submitted a brief02 to the SEC on the issue of the
necessity of a fixed rate to implement the Securities Exchange Act. Its brief
indicates that the present commission system may be against the public interest
which, the Department feels, is twofold; first, to be protected from high com-
mission rates, and second, to maintain an efficient auction market.08
The Department also contends that abolition of the present commission
system will increase the efficiency of the market by bringing many transactions
that are presently executed off the New York Exchange back to its floor. Under
the present system, members often deal elsewhere because of the high commis-
sion required by the New York Exchange. It is contended that if all com-
missions were negotiated, this incentive to go elsewhere would disappear. The
Department further contends that the danger of destructive pricing, the major
reason that minimum rates are permitted in any field, does not exist in this
area since there are not large fixed costs.
While the Justice Department's brief argues that once the minimum com-
mission is abolished, the very size of the New York Stock Exchange will cause
transactions on it to increase, 4 the Exchange feels that just the opposite will
happen. In their view, the minimum commission is a major factor in encouraging
brokers to join the exchange. If it were eliminated, the exchange believes these
brokers would find it more profitable to cross trades in their offices or deal
in the third market where there is no floor brokerage fee.08 When it was to
their advantage, these brokers could use the New York Exchange by nego-
tiating with floor brokers. If this did happen, the results would be dangerous.
The liquidity of the market would decrease, as would disclosure of prices. This
would result in haphazard price making. It also raises the possibility that an
unscrupulous broker could easily cheat a customer. Moreover, the market's
ability to handle volume and to minimize short run price fluctuations would
be reduced, and the quality of execution and services would be threatened.
61. Comment, supra note 52, at 234.
62. 198 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 16 (extra edition, May 3, 1968).
63. The Justice Department submitted a second memorandum on the subject on Janu-
ary 17, 1969 which outlined a plan that the Department believed was workable. The mini-
mum commission would immediately end on sales amounting to $50,000 or more and this
ceiling would decrease by $10,000 a year. If necessary to protect the small investor a
maximum commission would be established. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at 65, col. 1.
64. There will no longer be a reason to use the regional exchanges to escape the ex-
cessive commissions demanded by the New York Exchange.
65. New York Stock Exchange, Economic Effects of Negotiated Commission Rates on
the Brokerage Industry, the Market for Corporate Securities, and the Investing Public 23
(Aug. 1968).
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The exchanges likewise dispute the Justice Department's belief that nego-
tiated commissions will protect the investor from high commission rates. They
contend that there would be price discrimination with the heaviest burden
falling on the small investor. They also say that, after an initial highly com-
petitive period during which many small firms will be driven out of business,
the remaining firms might very well set informal commission minimums.60
V. CONCLUSION
If the stock exchange is right in its belief that the abolition of the minimum
commission would result in a drastic decrease in trade on the exchange, then
the danger of the move greatly outweighs any possible benefit that might come
out of it. It is essential to maintain an efficient market with the maximum
possible liquidity and depth. However, the danger that New York Stock Ex-
change transactions will substantially decrease if the minimum commission is
ended may have been overestimated by the exchange. Most large transactions
would still take place on the New York Exchange since that is the most likely
place to find enough buyers. Many small transactions would also continue to
take place on the New York Exchange because, except in the instance where
the broker happens to know of someone willing to buy, it would be more
convenient.
If the stock exchange has overestimated the danger of abolishing the mini-
mum commission system, has the Justice Department embellished the beneficial
results of such a move? It points out that the last two increases of the minimum
commission rate were opposed by a substantial number of members of the
exchange.6 7 Presumably, at least these brokers would charge lower rates if
given the opportunity. However, while there is convincing evidence that the
present rates are too high when applied to large transactions, the same has not
been shown to be true of smaller transactions. The institution of volume dis-
counts appears to be a rational way of dealing with the situation and it
avoids the dangers that the New York Exchange fears might arise if the
minimum commission system were abandoned altogether. Volume discounts,
in view of the possibility, however slight, of disastrous results if a more radical
step were taken, appear to be the most sensible means to correct the inequities
of the system. It should be given an opportunity.
66. Wall St. J., April 30, 1968, at 34, col. 5-6.
67. Supra note 62, at 23.
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